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THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION. By Jennifer L. Hochschild.I New Haven: Yale University Press.
1984. Pp. xvi, 263. Paper, $8.95.
Aaron Wildavsky2
But some see racism as anomalous: the dilemma of Americans is our continued
weakness in ... weeding out our shame so that our true creed may flourish. Once
we bring ourselves to pull the weeds, American idealism will bloom all the better.
Others see racism as symbiotic: the American garden is rooted in and nurtured by
blacks' second-class status. To eradicate it, we must be willing and able to change
the whole shape and ecology of the American landscape. Only then can the American creed blossom.
Anomaly theorists argue ... that a garden can be rejuvenated by pulling one
weed at a time. Symbiosis theorists argue that it cannot-if the soil and layout of a
garden are unsuited to their intended crops, pulling a few weeds does no good and
actually does harm by deluding us into false perceptions of progress.
Anomaly theorists argue ... that all Americans ... would prefer a garden
blooming with racial equity to one choking in the weeds of discrimination. Symbiosis theorists argue that we do not-that whites (and perhaps some blacks) benefit
from a landscape that includes racial discrimination and wiii resist the bulldozing
needed to reshape it. 3

***
We have no right to look upon future citizens as if we were master gardeners
who can tell the difference between a pernicious weed and a beautiful flower.4

In her tough-minded, trenchant marshalling of evidence, Jennifer Hochschild argues that since racial desegregation and political
democracy are at odds, representativeness should give way to results, equal rights to equal outcomes. Though Americans claim
they oppose racial segregation in schools, she contends, in fact we
are unwilling to adopt the necessary remedies. She claims further,
that incremental change actually makes things worse for white and
black alike. Hochschild recommends "bulldozing"-a quick, comprehensive, and coercive policy drawing in all children in entire
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Princeton University.
Professor, Political Science Department, Graduate School of Public Policy, and
Survey Research Center, University of California. I wish to thank John Ogbu and Paul
Sniderman for most helpful discussions.
3. J. HOCHSCHILD, supra, at 8-10.
4. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A LIBERAL STATE 139 (1980).
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metropolitan areas. Her analysis and her proposal are procrustean:
the policy fits all circumstances and all sizes of student populations.
This is a bravura performance, relentless and compelling. But is it
wise?
Just as pollution is defined as misplaced dirt, so the practical
definition of a weed is a flower in the wrong place. If everything has
to be changed ("the whole shape and ecology of the American landscape") to change anything ("one weed at a time"), it is no wonder
that Hochschild fears for progress. Where she spies foul weeds parading as fragrant flowers (are we now and have we ever been believers in the liberal creed?), I detect a confusion of classification.
Where she suggests a Rousseauian vision within which the American creed might blossom, I see Robespierre weeding out
undesirables.
Portraying herself as "a child of the 1960s" who shares "its
mistrust of and distaste for cautious middle-class-oriented change in
the face of serious, even desperate, problems,"s Hochschild begins
by contrasting racism and liberalism. Under liberalism, she writes,
"All citizens have an equal right to express their political wishes
and equal opportunity to act politically." By racism, however, she
does "not mean personal dislike or denigration of another race or
ethnic group" but rather "institutional racism," whether or not
intended.6
Although, generally, Hochschild is commendably candid, her
definition of equal opportunity turns out to be one of equal results.
For her, racism is any pattern of actions that result in different racial outcomes-"actions," as she says, "that usually elevate whites
and subordinate blacks. "7 If the measure of equal outcomes is used,
of course, then the game is over before it starts, because we all
know, without inquiring about equality of opportunity, that outcomes in America are far from equal. Indeed, by the time she is
finished, Hochschild has adopted Alan Freeman's view that racism
can be ended only by reverse discrimination, i.e., as she puts it,
"that blacks be given disproportionate resources, power, and status
until race would no longer affect people's life chances." In her
view, "[t]he great risk is that such a massive disruption of normal
patterns of reward and mobility would reveal the underlying class
structure, and destroy the belief in equal opportunity that is the
lynchpin of American society."s That is why she concludes, inexo5.
6.
7.
8.

J. HOCHSCHILD, supra, at xi.
/d. at 2.
/d.
/d. at 202.
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rably, according to her logic, that "[i]f whites cannot bring themselves to give up the advantages that America's racial and class
practices give them, they must permit elites to make that choice for
them."9 So much for democracy.
Having altered the conventional definition of liberalism from
equal opportunity to equal results, Hochschild not surprisingly concludes that liberalism is incompatible with racism. She earlier defined racism as contrary to liberalism because "[i]t uses ascriptive
characteristics, not achieved character, to determine people's fate,
and it proclaims that some groups should not partake of liberalism's
promises."w Thus "racism" is now to be remedied by treating the
majority of the population by their ascriptive characteristics, i.e., by
denying them equal opportunity.
This summary treatment of Hochschild's position does not do
justice to the flair and distinction with which she buttresses her position. She makes use of a wide variety of data on black-white differences. She is aware that the overall position of blacks is
improving but that by some measures things are getting worse. She
is dismayed by the evidence that whites think things are getting better for blacks and blacks think they are getting worse. Her discussion of the evidence on busing is broad, fair, and persuasive. Even
when concluding that more drastic busing produces better public
acceptance and, insofar as may be determined, academic performance, she provides counterinterpretations of the evidence.
The strongest part of this book, a book with which all later
writers will have to contend, is its discussion of the evidence on
desegregation. Instead of the view that all is peaches and cream or
that all is rotten, Hochschild makes a good case for the marginally
positive effects of desegregation. She is also ingenious in trying to
show that incremental change does not lead to outcomes as good as
radical change.
Nevertheless, I find her position, despite its force and verve,
wanting. It is not so much what Hochschild puts in her admirable
book but what she leaves out that is troublesome. As a citizen and a
political scientist, I never (literally, never) think of any matter of
political importance without asking myself about its consequences
for race relations. For the future of American democracy may well
depend on whether and to what extent racial reconciliation takes
place. Would Hochschild's recommendations, I ask, take us closer
to or further from that goal? In analyzing that question, I will be9.
10.

/d. at 203.
/d. at 2.
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gin with a closer look at her attack on incrementalism, and will then
consider some broader issues relating to busing.
I.

INCREMENTALISM AND RESISTANCE

Hochschild uses the doctrine of incrementalism as a metaphor
for conservative (small, slow, partial) as opposed to radical (large,
speedy, fundamental) change. Let us consider this doctrine in historical perspective. A famous version of incrementalism, Sir Karl
Popper's "piecemeal social engineering," was deliberately designed
as a counterweight to dictatorial political systems whose leaders
thought they had the knowledge ("scientific socialism") or the intuition ("Meinkampf') to achieve grand objectives without taking
into account popular preferences. In response, Popper sought to
outline a far less ambitious approach that would conserve consent
and understanding. The now-classical formalization of incrementalism is due to Charles E. Lindblom's seminal work.11 In his
hands, disjointed incrementalism, with its serial, remedial, smallscale attacks on problems, became a formal rival to synoptic or
comprehensive decision making. The emphasis was on the use of
the plural character of interests in society as aids to calculation.
Instead of being viewed as a defect of democracy, as the unfortunate
irrationality of the citizenry, Lindblom converted the desirability of
consent into a positive asset.l2
At this point it is important to observe what incrementalism
was not. As Simon put it, decision makers "satisficed" because they
had not the wit to maximize. When you thought you knew better,
you tried to do better. In Lindblom's socially oriented approach,
incrementalism was always a doctrine of the second best. When
ends were substantially agreed and knowledge of means was strong,
that was first best. Where those conditions did not obtain, amidst
the usual doubts about causality and disagreement about objectives,
incremental methods were appropriate substitutes.
Although this facet has been insufficiently appreciated, incrementalism was also part of the doctrine of the positive state. Were
incrementalism designed to justify inaction, the doctrine would
have stressed the unacceptability, not the desirability, of trying out
small moves. Given the increasing size and scope of government,
one possible response to those who argued that intervention was
interference, because no one knew enough to assure desirable conse11. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 Pus. ADMIN. REV., Spring
1959, at 79; and D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY
EVALUATION AS A SociAL PROCESS (1963).
12. C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY

(1965).
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quences, was to say that there was an evolutionary sequence of
small steps that would enable government to learn (perhaps quite
rapidly) how to do better.
As incrementalism changed from a challenge to comprehensive
means-ends analysis into something like the received wisdom, it became the object of numerous critiques. On the side of calculation, it
became clear that decision makers might be more dependent on theory-if only to distinguish the effects of one marginal move from
many others taking place at the same time-than was once
thought.D In regard to agreement, the pluralist underpinnings of
incrementalism-all interests would receive adequate representation
in the political process-came under attack.I4 My impression is
that as various authors began to doubt the rightness of American
political life, especially as they felt its institutions were too inegalitarian, the acceptability of incrementalism declined. Is
If we think of conservatism not as an innate psychological disposition but as a judgment about how far a system's outcomes are
from one's own preferences, the charge that incrementalism is conservative makes sense. Willingness to accept small departures from
the status quo does depend on how acceptable the point of departure is in the first place. For example, today antinuclear and other
similar groups composed largely of leftistsi6 oppose incremental
technological change.11 Thus the same sort of people, with similar
political views, who regard incrementalism in social policies such as
busing as unconscionably conservative, regard a similar approach to
technology as murderously radical.
Incrementalism also has implications regarding public consent.
In this regard, the difference between voting and busing as civil
rights measures is illuminating. The legislative provisions in regard
to voting took a long time amidst repeated struggles to enact. Once
13. See comments to this effect in A. WtLDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY
PROCESS xii-xiv (2d ed. 1974).
14. See the preface to the second edition of R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, EcoNOMICS AND WELFARE (1976).
15. In addition to note II and to J. HOCHSCHILD, see Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not
Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 517. That the debate over pluralism
is also essentially a difference over equality may also be seen in the second edition of N.
POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY (1980).
16. M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982).
17. Huber, Exorcists vs. Gatekeepers in Risk Regulation, 7 REG., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 23;
and Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025 (1983). See
Pearce, The Preconditions for Achieving Consensus in the Context of Technological Risk, in
TECHNOLOGICAL RISK: ITS PERCEPTION AND HANDLING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
57 (M. Dierkes, S. Edwards & R. Coppock ed. 1980); Wildavsky, Trial Without Error: Anticipation Versus Resilience as Strategies for Risk Reduction, in REGULATORY REFORM: NEw
VISION OR OLD CURSE? 200-21 (M. Maxey & R. Kuhn ed. 1985); Goodin, No Moral Nukes,
90 ETHICS 417 (1980).
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passed into law, however, the voting provisions were quickly implemented. There may be a tradeoff, therefore, between the slowness
of legislation, in which disagreements are either resolved or accepted with resignation, reasonable opportunity to decide otherwise
having been exhausted, and the speed of implementation. Conversely, judge-made laws, quickly enacted, may leave so many questions unresolved, and so many voices unheard, that they spawn
endless resistance in the process of implementation. Is
Hochschild's view is quite the contrary. Her view, briefly, is
this: What is decisive in school desegregation-what determines
whether it succeeds or not-is decisiveness itself. Limit the scope of
desegregation, or leave some aspects of it open to discussion, and
you buy trouble. For you give opponents a reason to fight, to resist.
Decide the issue, therefore, unambiguously, authoritatively, once
and for all-making sure to leave no loopholes. Then people will
accept desegregation and busing and do the best they can to make it
work, either because they are (or will shortly become) persuaded
that busing is desirable, or because they have been persuaded that it
is inevitable.
How convincing is this blitzkrieg view of social change? It is
not implausible at first blush, especially if courts can compel consent. But coordinating a unified national attack on the segregated
schools would present grave difficulties. It is one thing for one
judge to pick on a city, like Boston, and take over the local school
system. It would be quite another to do this on a regional, even a
national, scale, running across city and suburban (and state?) jurisdictions as Hochschild wants.
More generally, whether the courts are up to accomplishing
desegregation depends in part upon what doing so entails. Desegregation could mean seeing to it that blacks and whites go to school
together, or at any rate making sure that blacks are not prevented
from going to school with whites by public officials. But that is not
really what Hochschild has in mind-certainly, not all that she has
in mind. School desegregation in her view is a quite open-ended
objective-to eliminate any practice, or habit of thought, within the
school disadvantageous to blacks. As Hochschild tells her readers,
18. A plausible inference from the cases in N. POLSBY, POLITICAL INNOVATION IN
AMERICA (1984), is that over the medium run slow-moving innovations appear to become
more legitimate. A partial parallel is provided by the contrast between the lengthy processes
in which environmental legislation is spawned in Sweden and other European countries compared to the spate of legislation in the United States, and the reversal so far as implementation is concerned. See the citations in A. Wildavsky, Doing More and Using Less:
Utilization of Research as a Result of Regime (paper delivered to the Joint Science Center
Berlin/Stanford University research project and conference on "Cross-National Policy Research," to be published in a conference volume).
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Full and complete desegregation would call into question parents' rights to send
their children to private schools, teachers' seniority rights, the sanctity of city /suburb school district lines, and local financing and control of schools, to mention only
a few sacred cows. Not only poor but also rich whites would have to give up precious components of their class position for desegregation to be complete.
Desegregation's indirect attack on the class structure-its revelation of the hollowness of the equal opportunity ideal-is most dangerous to all. A demand for full
and complete desegregation, and the responses to such a demand, unmask the role
of schools in perpetuating rather than mitigating the class structure and the structure itself. Desegregation demands expose unwarranted tracking within schools,
disparities in resources, expectations, and curriculum between schools, and the
strong connections among family background, academic achievement, race, and occupational success. The more blacks focus on results rather than opportunities and
on institutional biases rather than individual acts, the more the liberal values of
opportunity and individualism appear fraudulent or at best weak. Once these values are questioned, the whole social structure is called into question; once that occurs, the class structure becomes visible and therefore a subject of contention.I9

Guaranteeing equal results from schooling is something, so far as I
know, that no nation has done.
And if I am right in this-not right in supposing that things
must miscarry, only that they may-then the key limitation of
Hochschild's analysis stands out: She spends scarcely any time
worrying about what happens if things go wrong. Is it all that obvious that we could not be worse off, following the policy she advances? Is it reasonable to suppose, for example, that white
attitudes toward blacks must continue to improve? Hochschild argues that racism is built into American society; yet her recommendation makes sense only on the supposition that America has
goodwill toward blacks, perhaps more so than other societies. So
much so, in her own view, that Americans are willing to undertake
in their behalf what no other society has. I see no reason to suppose
that racial prejudice has had its day, that bigotry cannot make a
comeback; it has before; it could again. Nor would I have supposed
that the place of the courts-or more generally, the role of the
law-was so secure as to require no concern whatever. It may be
that American institutions seem so stable that instability and its
consequences for the worst off, who often suffer most, need not be
taken into account. Or it could be that existing inequalities are considered so unconscionable that nothing could be worse. Either way,
political consent is evidently not considered a scarce resource.
The problem of implementation seems to me severe because I
think Hochschild, otherwise so acute, has in one critical respect
quite misunderstood the view of those she calls "anomaly" theorists-above all Myrdal. The anomaly thesis, as I understand it,
comes to this: Americans have (or had) one set of ideas and convic19.

J.

HOCHSCHILD,

supra, at 155-56.
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tions about liberty and equality and fairness for whites, another for
blacks. Their views regarding blacks are (or were), literally, anomalous: different from, and at odds with, their views generally; which
is, of course, the reason for Myrdal's (relative) optimism. But the
dilemma that interests Hochschild is quite different. The great obstacle from Hochschild's point of view is precisely the source of optimism from Myrdal's. For Myrdal supposes that it is only
necessary for Americans to change their opinions about blacks,
whereas Hochschild supposes that they must change their basic values. Where Myrdal's dilemma is one of classification, i.e., whites
placing blacks in the category where enlightened rules apply, Hochschild wants to change the rules. From Hochschild's point of view,
the real obstacles are not a set of attitudes brought into play only or
chiefly on racial issues. Many citizens object to a range of policies
to assist blacks; but-and this seems an important point-they object to such policies whoever they are intended to help. They take
the same position on policies designed to help women (e.g., comparable worth) or Mexican Americans (e.g., affirmative action). Myrdal's dilemma could be resolved in favor of racial equality (as he
conceived it) because the weight of American values favored resolution; it is much less obvious that Hochschild's dilemma can be resolved in favor of racial equality (as she conceives it) because the
weight of American values opposes it. Simply put, it asks whites to
give a kind of assistance to blacks they would oppose even for
whites. Movement toward equality of condition, as Hochschild prefers, is not at all the same as equality of opportunity or equality
before the law, which most Americans now support. Starting with
the older dilemma, when black people were denied equal rights,
Hochschild has slipped in a dilemma that is real for her and for
those who share her views but not for most Americans.
II.

WHAT BOX ARE WE IN?

Incrementalism is intended to deal with situations in which we
either lack consensus about goals or knowledge about means. Recourse to a version of the justly renowned Thompson-Tuden matrix,
relating knowledge to agreement, will tell us that in regard to busing we not only disagree about what to do but about even which box
we are in.zo
20.
sion, in

Thompson & Tuden, Strategies, Structures, and Processes of Organizational Deci·
195-216 (J. Thompson ed. 1959).

COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION
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Agreement
Much

Little

Much

1) Computation

3) Bargaining

Little

2) Search

4) ?

Knowledge

Everyone agrees that we are not in box one, where there is nearly
total agreement on objectives and nearly complete understanding of
means. There are those, against whom Hochschild directs her argument, who say that there is much agreement on the objective of
improving education through integrated schools but little understanding of whether busing is a good way of securing integration
and whether integration will improve education. They view themselves as being in box two, searching for better solutions. Hochschild, however, places them in box three: these whites know how
to achieve integration and make it serve education but they do not
want to give up their privileges. Hence they bargain for less onerous forms, such as voluntary busing, limitations to older students,
busing into white schools, in sum, the very provisions that Hochschild contends weaken its positive educational effects. Recent
work by Arthur L. Stinchcombe and D. Garth Taylor suggests another explanation for resistance to busing.21 They find that:
busing attitudes are only weakly related to the traditional, psychological measure of
racism or prejudice . . . . (N]ational data and our own analyses show the same for
Boston during the time of the court order. Busing attitudes are, however related to
people's perceptions that the new costs of integration by busing are inequitably allocated, illegitimately arrived at (illegitimately decided by the courts and the establishment), and pose personal threats to the personal weil-being and academic
achievement of one's children. For instance, people's attitudes about what will happen to test scores predicts very strongly how much opposition they will show to the
court order.22

According to Hochschild, "Americans must choose between
standard, apparently desirable modes of policy choice and enactment, and the goal of eradicating racism. If whites cannot bring
themselves to give up the advantages that America's racial and class
practices give them, they must permit elites to make that choice for
them."23 That last phrase-elites to make choices for Americansis a dagger aimed at democracy.24 Before adopting the thesis that
21.
GATION:
22.
23.
24.

Stinchombe & Taylor, On Democracy and School Integration, in SCHOOL DESEGREPAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 157-86 (W. Stephan & J. Feagin ed. 1980).
!d. at 177.
]. HOCHSCHILD, supra, at 203.
See Wildavsky, The "Reverse Sequence" in Civil Liberties, 78 Pus. INT. 32 (1985).
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majorities have to be deprived of the right to effective representation
in order to facilitate a gain in achievement by minorities, we ought,
at a minimum, to be pretty well convinced that the remedy, desegregation by busing, will work. Otherwise, public policy will leave
whites and blacks angry at institutions that do not live up either to
their procedural or substantive promises. The possible explanation
I am about to suggest, building on the work of others, is at once
comforting-differences in ability are not at issue-and despairing-the factor at fault may be much more difficult to change.
The usual factors in discussion of differences in racial achievement-racism, social and economic class, educational resources,
family background, school expectations, language difficulties, prior
ceilings on jobs, culturally biased organizations-all have a place,
but they are readily subject to discount in the context of the experience of different racial and ethnic groups. A recent example that
will have to stand for many others, because the literature is far too
extensive to be summarized here, concerns the effects of poor
health. On average, black children are less healthy than their white
counterparts. But one of the unhealthiest groups in the country,
carrying a legacy of disease from Southeast Asia, are the
Vietnamese. Yet their educational motivation and achievement, despite this evident handicap and despite language and cultural differences, are considerable, soon placing them above many whites, all
without evident abandonment of their home culture.
Let us consider, instead, another variable-time spent in
school and doing homework. If blacks spend considerably less time
in school and do less homework, then no one need be surprised that
they do less well in the measurable attitudes of educational achievement. And that apparently is exactly the situation. Even blacks
with higher educational aspirations study a lot less.2s Yet a positive
25. J. 0GBU, THE NEXT GENERATION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF EDUCATION IN AN
URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (1974); Racial Stratification and Education: The Case of Stockton,
California, 12 ICRD BULL. I (1977); and Schooling in the Inner City, 21 Soc. 75-79 (1983).
See also J. HANNA, UNDERSTANDING AND COPING WITH DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN
AMERICA: LIKE ME, MEDDLE ME IN A DESEGREGATED SCHOOL (forthcoming); D. HOLLAND & M. EISENHART, WOMEN'S PEER GROUPS AND CHOICE OF 'CAREERS (1982); J.
0GBU, INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN STOCKTON,
CALIFORNIA, AND GWEMBE, ZAMBIA, (Kroeber Anthropological Papers, No. 63 & 64,
1984); L. WEIS, BETWEEN Two WoRLDS (1985). There is a crying need for ethnographic
investigations of contemporary American life. Saying one studies, as part of a self-report, is
not nearly as reliable as being observed to study by a trained observer who has come to know
you and your family. (Much the same is true, of course, of faculty time studies.) The excuses
for absences, for instance, are likely to change radically from the approved reasons in the
student handbook to more personally relevant reasons when speaking to a knowledgeable and
unthreatening observer. It may well be that the much-discussed decline in test scores among
whites would yield to a more refined "time and concentration" study.
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attitude toward education, manifested by spending more time getting educated, would seem entirely compatible with ethnic and racial identity and with individual integrity. If schools, parents, and
peers all reinforced respect for education, one would expect a gradual reduction of black-white differences in achievement within the
context of improvement for all. Simple, isn't it? Then why doesn't
it happen?
When blacks were ready and willing to accept educational integration, not only in the sense of sitting next to white skins, but of
accepting similar educational standards, they were denied that opportunity. When many whites were willing to sit in the same classrooms, provided that educational standards were shared, many
blacks were no longer willing. The legacy of racism somehow
turned in on itself. Educational standards, once used to put blacks
down, had themselves become tainted just as these self-same standards were about to bring them up. Any white club willing to have
them, as the great Groucho put it, was not worth joining. If it is not
any innate individual difference but this acquired cultural difference
that distinguishes the black experience from that of other ethnic and
racial groups who share many of the same initial handicaps, the
American dilemma is bigger than we thought.
A recent paper by Harry Eckstein raises the right issue. Do
the groups under consideration want to be treated like others or are
they deliberately rejecting the mainstream culture, including its
modes of learning for educational achievement?26 Building on
Mary Metz's seminal study of schools as moral orders,n Eckstein
probes the deep implications of self-exclusion. Here, for the purpose of this review essay, it is sufficient to consider the implications
of self-exclusion for Hochschild's thesis.
It is hard to see how the promise of American life, that combination of cultural diversity and material abundance, can be even
partially fulfilled without both racial integration and educational
achievement. Certainly, Hochschild's version of our common dilemma is that it is not to be solved by giving up one for the other,
achievement for integration, but by maintaining that these goals are
(or can be made to be) mutually supportive. In this optimism, she
reveals her quintessentially American character. But how?
It is possible that the small positive effects observed from racial
integration in classrooms occur because of the moral influence in
favor of achievement. Coercion can bring these students into closer
26.

H. Eckstein, Civil Inclusion and Its Discontents (typescript}.

27. M. METZ, CLASSROOMS AND CORRIDORS: THE CRISIS OF AUTHORITY IN DESEG·
REGATED SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1978).
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proximity; but it can also breed hostility if the value of education is
in dispute. When it is recognized that the criteria of achievement in
the larger, white society, criteria that Hochschild accepts, have yet
to be accepted by many blacks, the limits on coercion become
apparent.
Another alternative is suggested by anthropologist John Ogbu:
[T]he academic performance of Black children can be increased (a) by having Black
children adopt more serious attitudes toward their schoolwork and (b) by increasing
their efforts and perseverance at their schoolwork ....
One prerequisite for finding a "solution" to the "community" dimension of the
problem of persistent disproportionate academic lag of Black students is to recognize that this aspect of the problem exists. Blacks and similar minorities have generally expressed a kind of institutional discrimination perspective or "blaming the
system" perspective .... This needs to be balanced with a recognition that some of
their own responses to the "institutionalized discrimination" or to the dominant
Whites' exploitation also contribute to the academic difficulties of Black children.
From this point of view, my analysis is addressed largely to people in the Black
community. I believe that given the oppositional theme underlying the problem,
Black children are more likely to change their attitudes and behaviors if encouraged
to do so from within the Black community ....
Current awareness programs for Black students and similar minorities tend to
emphasize discovering racial and ethnic identities and pride. This is fine but not
enough. It is not enough to discover who they are or that they have their own racial
or ethnic culture, especially if that reinforces equating school learning with acculturation into White middle-class culture ....
Blacks and similar castelike minorities tend to have what is essentially an acculturation or assimilation view of schooling. That is, they view schooling as learning White culture and identity or changing into White culturally and cognitively.
Given that Blacks maintain oppositional identity ... there is ... ambivalence toward learning in school or "acting White." The dilemma is that the individual
Black student has to choose between academic success or school success and being
Black.28

Around the nation a variety of schools and school districts29
are implicitly following his advice in setting, monitoring, and enforcing high academic standards for all pupils. Tests are taken seriously, not as examples of cultural imperialism. Pupils are held back
when they don't measure up. Excellence is color blind. It ought to
work. If not, America faces the prospect of declining performance
together with ever more bitter struggles over the political allocation
of material goods. Only a single outcome is certain: The America
28. J. Ogbu, Understanding Community Forces Affecting Minority Students' Academic
Effort (prepared for The Achievement Council of California, May 1984, and adapted from
chapter 1 of CROSSING CULTURE BouNDARIES: RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF HIGH EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND LoW ScHOOL PERFORMANCE (in preparation)). Richard
Rodriquez writes beautifully of this dilemma for Mexican Americans in his Hunger of Memory(1981).
29. Oakland Tribune, Apr. 7, 1985, and succeeding days, ran a series on such schools.
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the victors inherit won't be worth having. And that is the most unAmerican dilemma I can think of.
My own sense of the fitness of things (I grew up in Brooklyn
where, despite calumnies, far more than a single tree grows) is based
on a city boy's marvel at nature the trickster. Especially at her
sweetest. On my fence in Oakland I have growing a lush vine, clematis armandii, which, besides producing a bevy of white flowers, is
suffused with a sweet fragrance. It perfumes the air and is otherwise a delight. It is also easy to handle. One can snip off segments
easily with little damage to appearance or odor. Should our vine
entwine itself around another flower, however, it will keep tightening itself in such a loving embrace that soon friendly, welcoming,
luscious clematis chokes the life out of its host. The wise, the adage
goes, should protect against the damage done by the merely good.

